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Abstract: The concept of harmony does not play a very important role in 
contemporary analytic philosophy. In this paper, I argue that this peripheral status 
of the concept of harmony in analytic philosophy is not warranted. In fact, harmony 
might be the central normative concept: some philosophers think that complex 
unity is the metaphysical grounds of intrinsic value: whenever something is 
intrinsically valuable, it is so in virtue of the fact that disparate elements are 
brought into complex wholes. In this paper I discuss the possibility that harmony, 
rather than complex unity, plays this pivotal role. I conclude that, while there are 
some considerations in favour of this view, there are also considerations that speak 
against it; nevertheless, analytic philosophers should be more concerned with the 




The concept of harmony has traditionally played an important role in the ethical 
outlooks of many cultures. It is an important concept in Confucianism, it plays an 
important role in the philosophy of Native Americans and other indigenous cultures 
(Miller 2019), and it has been an important concept in the thought of many classical 
Greek thinkers. However, this interest in harmony as an ethical concept has hardly 
carried over into contemporary analytical philosophy. Harmony is sometimes 
mentioned in passing when philosophers talk about another concept that has gained 
quite some attention, namely the concept of organic unity.1 The principle of organic 
unity says that the value of a whole need not equal the sum of the value of its 
individual parts2: for example, the individual brushstrokes of a painting have little or 
no value at all, but in combination, they can constitute great aesthetic value. An object 
exhibits organic unity to the extent that it is a “highly unified complexity” (Oddie 
2005, 130): when individual entities form a new whole, then this constitutes organic 
unity, and this in turn means that the value of the new whole can be greater than the 
sum of the value of the individual parts when they are taken in isolation. Philosophers 
who talk about unified complexities sometimes mention the concept of harmony and 
treat harmony and unified complexity as identical. But other than that, harmony does 
not play a very important role in contemporary analytic philosophy. 
In this paper, I will argue that this peripheral status of the concept of harmony in 
analytic philosophy is not warranted. Analytic philosophers should be more interested 
in harmony as an axiological concept. I will be especially concerned with the relation 
 
 JÖRG LÖSCHKE is currently an SNSF-funded research professor at the University of 
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1 See, for example, Nozick (1981) or Kelly (2014). 
2 The locus classicus for a discussion of organic unity is Moore (1903). 
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between harmony and organic (or complex) unity. If it is true that harmony and 
organic unity amount to the same thing, then this means that two objects that are 
brought into harmony constitute value over and above the value of the individual 
parts that are brought into harmony. This, by itself, would be a philosophically 
significant result. But there is another and possibly more far-reaching implication. 
Some philosophers think that organic unity is the metaphysical ground of intrinsic 
value: they think that the fact that an entity constitutes an organic unity not only 
explains how valuable the entity is, but also explains why the entity is valuable in the 
first place. In other words, the property of being an organic unity is the fundamental 
value-constituting property, and whenever something is intrinsically good, it is good 
because it is a highly unified complexity.3 If this view is correct, and if organic unity 
and harmony amount to the same thing, then this means that harmony grounds 
intrinsic value. This would certainly be a spectacular result. In this paper, I will be 
concerned with this possibly far-reaching claim in particular, and I will investigate 
whether harmony could be the metaphysical grounds of intrinsic value. 
My paper will be structured as follows. Part I explains what it means for several 
objects to form an organic unity, and what it means for several objects to be in 
harmony with each other. I will argue that, while these concepts are similar in certain 
regards, they are nevertheless distinct concepts. Part II presents arguments in favour 
of understanding complex unity as the metaphysical grounds of intrinsic value, and I 
suggest that these arguments speak more in favour of understanding harmony as the 
metaphysical grounds of value. Part III discusses two interesting implications of 
understanding harmony as the metaphysical grounds of intrinsic value: it offers a new 
interpretation of consequentialism, and it possibly explains the overridingness of 
moral reasons. Part IV raises some worries about understanding harmony as the 
metaphysical grounds of value. 
 
I. Organic Unity and Harmony 
 
What is an organic unity? As I have mentioned above, the crucial feature of an 
organic unity is that it constitutes value over and beyond the sum the value of its 
individual parts. Hence, one important way to characterize organic unities is in terms 
of value: a set of entities E1, E2, E3 forms an organic unity of the individual parts, 
taken together, exemplify more value than the value of the sum of the individual 
parts. But we can also give more informative accounts of what organic unities are. 
Apart from generating additional value, an important aspect of organic unities is 
interdependence (Kelly 2014, 117): the individual parts of an organic unity are not 
just there simultaneously but respond to one another in some way. Take the example 
of the human body. The human body as a whole has great intrinsic value, but this 
value cannot be reduced to the value of its constituent parts – the left arm, the right 
 
3 See, for example, Nozick (1981); Oddie (2005, 2014); Audi (2007); Davison (2012); Kelly 
(2014). 
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leg, the liver, the eyes, etc. All these elements have little value when they are taken in 
isolation, but the human body as a whole has great intrinsic value. And one important 
aspect of the body parts is the way how they interact – this just makes the body a 
living organism. Similarly, the individual brushstrokes of a beautiful painting must 
respond to one another in some way to create the aesthetic value that the painting has. 
In both cases, the constituent parts of the whole interact with one another. And, more 
importantly, by interacting in this way, the individual parts not only create new value, 
they also form a new entity. A human body not simply the sum of the individual 
bodily parts, but forms a new entity; and a painting is also a new entity, not merely 
the sum of the individual brushstrokes. Neither the value of the whole nor the kind of 
thing that the whole is can be reduced to a mere sum of the individual parts when we 
talk about an organic unity. Hence, we can characterize organic unities in the 
following way: a set of entities E1, E2, E3 etc. constitutes an organic unity if these 
entities form a complex whole, and they form a complex whole if they constitute a 
new entity that cannot be reduced to the sum of its constituent parts. And to constitute 
such a new entity, there must be meaningful relations between the constituent 
entities.4 
This, of course, raises further questions. What does it mean for a set of entities to 
constitute a new and distinct entity? And what does it mean for the constitutive 
entities to stand in meaningful relations to one another? I will address these questions 
in turn. I will be able to give only tentative rather than satisfactory answers, but my 
brief discussion will be important for what follows. 
Let me start with the first question. When does a set of entities constitute a new 
entity? The question here is not what makes it the case that a set of specific 
constitutive elements forms a specific new entity, but rather under which 
circumstances we recognize that a new entity has emerged from a set of constitutive 
entities. To see the difference, consider the case of friendship. A friendship is a 
distinct entity with the two friends as constitutive elements, but a friendship cannot be 
reduced to the friends – it is not as if a friendship is an aggregate of friend A and 
friend B. Something else is going on that makes it the case that there is not only friend 
A and friend B, but also the friendship between them. Now, it is one thing to ask what 
makes it the case that these two people form a friendship, and the answer will 
probably include things such as a common history between them, experiences that 
they have shared, mutual concern for one another’s well-being, etc. But this does not 
explain why the friendship between friend A and friend B is a distinct entity. It 
presupposes it. Hence, the question what makes it the case that a set of entities 
constitutes a new kind of entity and the question what makes it the case that this 
specific set of entities constitutes this specific new entity are two separate questions, 
and I will be concerned with the first question here. 
 
4 For the remainder of this paper, I will use the terms “organic unity” and “complex unity” 
interchangeably. 
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So the question is under which circumstances it is appropriate to say that a new 
entity has emerged from a set of other entities. I cannot give a satisfactory answer to 
this question here. But this does not seem to be necessary – humans have an intuitive 
grasp of when a set of entities forms a new entity. Often certain social background 
conditions play an important role in this regard: for example, an opera performance is 
a complex whole whose constitutive elements include singing, acting, an orchestra 
performance, etc., but it is only possible to say that these elements constitute a new 
kind of entity because the opera genre and the accompanying social practices have 
been invented and developed.5 But there might be at least a test whether a given set of 
entities constitutes a complex unity or whether it is a mere aggregate.6 Suppose that 
you have a set of entities and you want to determine whether they together form a 
complex whole or a mere aggregate. You already have an intuitive grasp on other 
cases of complex wholes – you know, for example, that an opera is a complex whole 
whereas a pile of stones is a mere aggregate. Now, one difference between complex 
wholes and mere aggregates seems to be this. If you remove a stone from a pile of 
stones, the remaining thing is still a pile of stone. It is simply a smaller pile of stones, 
or put differently, the remaining thing is less than it was before. This does not apply 
to the opera case. If you remove a constitutive part of the opera – say, the singing – it 
seems odd to say that the remaining thing is still an opera, but less than it was before. 
It seems more plausible to suppose that the remaining thing ceases to be an opera, or 
that it is a distorted kind of opera, or whatever. This suggests the following test for 
whether a set of entities forms an organic unity or a mere aggregate: a set of entities 
forms a new kind of entity if it is not possible to remove one entity from the set and 
say that the remaining thing is the same thing as it was before, but simply less; and a 
set of entities forms a mere aggregate if it is possible to remove one entity from the 
set and say that the remaining thing is the same thing as it was before, but simply 
less.7 And typically a set of entities forms a new kind of entity rather than a mere 
aggregate if there are meaningful relations between the constitutive elements of the 
new thing. 
This brings me to the second question. I have said that a set of entities forms a 
complex whole if there are meaningful relations between the different parts that 
constitute the new entity. But what does it mean for entities to have meaningful 
relations? Again, I cannot offer a general account of meaningful relations that applies 
to all possible cases. But there are some ways in which it seems intuitively plausible 
to maintain that relations between different parts are meaningful. For example, Alexis 
Elder discusses the question when parts form unified wholes, and she identifies the 
following forms of meaningful relations between individual parts that are relevant 
here: the parts are mutually responsive to each other; they somehow work together; 
 
5 See Raz (2003). 
6 Thanks to Sebastian Muders for suggesting this test to me. 
7  Note that I am not talking about the value of the thing in question here, but about the 
ontological or metaphysical question whether the thing is a complex whole or a mere 
aggregate. I thank Dascha During for helping me to clarify this. 
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and/or they mutually shape each other (Elder 2018, 42). Of course, these possibilities 
are not mutually exclusive: individual parts can relate to each other in more than one 
of these ways, and they can possibly relate to each other in all these ways at once. 
However, any of these ways seems sufficient for meaningful relations between 
individual entities to arise in the sense that is relevant here.8 
With these considerations in mind, we are now in the position to see in what way 
harmony and organic unity are similar concepts and in what ways they differ from 
each other. They are similar in that things that are in harmony with each other also 
have meaningful relations between them. Consider typical examples of things that are 
in harmony. A dish can exemplify harmony if the ingredients are mutually responsive 
to each other: the taste of ingredient A complements the taste of ingredient B, the 
small amount of salt intensifies the taste of the vegetables, etc. Similarly, the tones of 
several instruments can be in harmony, and this means that they complement each 
other and work together to create a beautiful melody. Personal relationships such as 
marriages can also be harmonious, and if this is the case, then all of the 
aforementioned kinds of meaningful relations apply: the partners are responsive to 
each other in that they take their respective concerns seriously and care for one 
another’s well-being; they work together in several joint projects, from raising 
children to organizing their lives together; and the partners shape each other in that 
they have an impact on one another’s identity, taste, concerns, etc. These examples 
illustrate that harmony resembles organic unity in that entities that are in harmony 
exemplify the same kinds of meaningful relations as entities that constitute organic 
unities. 
But these examples also illustrate an important difference between harmony and 
organic unity: unlike organic unities, entities that are in harmony do not necessarily 
constitute a novel entity. Consider again the case of a dish. A certain dish is a novel 
entity because the ingredients form a complex whole. But if the ingredients are in 
harmony, this does not mean that they constitute yet another entity over the already 
existing complex whole – dishes whose ingredients are in harmony are just as much 
dishes as dishes whose ingredients are not in harmony. If anything, you might think 
that the harmonious dish is a better dish – it is a better instance of its kind. Similarly, 
a marriage can be disharmonious in that the partners fight and argue constantly. In 
such a case, their marriage ceases to be harmonious, but it does not cease to be a 
marriage: disharmonious relationships are still relationships. Relationships are 
“enduring, substantive, mutually affirmed interactions between two or more people” 
(Seglow 2013, 28), and such enduring interactions can exist even if the relationship 
members treat each other in disharmonious ways. And again, if a disharmonious 
relationship turns into a harmonious one, we would not say that the harmony now 
constitutes yet another entity, apart from the already existing relationship – if 
 
8 Another interesting proposal comes from Chris Kelly: Kelly argues that meaningful relations 
that constitute complex wholes are explanatory relations. See Kelly (2014: 122). I do not have 
the space here to discuss this view; in any case, the relations identified by Elder seem to be 
explanatory relations as well, so these two accounts are no rivals, strictly speaking. 
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anything, we would say that the relationship is a better one for being harmonious. 
Thus, a specific entity is not necessarily the specific entity that it is in virtue of 
harmonious relations of the constitutive parts; if anything, harmonious relations 
between the constitutive entities can make the new entity a better one of its kind. And 
this means that organic unity and harmony are not the same thing. If they were, then it 
would have to be the case that a composite object that ceases to exemplify harmony 
also ceases to be the object that it is. Hence, contrary to what some authors suggest, 
harmony and organic unity do not amount to the same thing.9 And this means that 
elements can have harmonious relations even if they are not an organic unity, that is: 
even if they do not form a distinct kind of entity. 
Several authors have proposed to understand complex unity as a metaphysical 
account of value: intrinsic value supervenes on or is grounded in the fact that 
disparate elements are brought into complex wholes. 10  Such views therefore 
understand complex unity as the metaphysical grounds of intrinsic value in the sense 
that the property of being a complex unity makes it the case that the relevant entity is 
intrinsically valuable. However, as far as I can see, no author in analytic philosophy 
has argued that we should understand harmony as the metaphysical grounds of 
intrinsic value. In the next section, I will argue that value theorists should take the 
idea seriously that harmony, rather than organic unity, should be understood as the 
metaphysical basis of value. 
 
II. Harmony and Intrinsic Value 
 
A first argument in favour of understanding harmony as the metaphysical grounds of 
intrinsic value is the observation that such a view has considerable explanatory depth. 
Philosophers who understand complex unity as the metaphysical grounds of intrinsic 
value support their view by the observation that it provides a unified explanation of 
the value of many things that do not seem to have very much in common.11 Consider, 
for example, the following items: ecosystems, friendships, works of art, life courses, 
and true scientific theories. Each of these items seems to be a good candidate for 
something that is intrinsically good. Nevertheless, they do not seem to have much in 
common at first sight. In what way are works of art are like friendships or scientific 
theories? One possible answer is that each of these items is a complex whole: 
ecosystems bring a variety of living organism into a complex whole; friendships unify 
the desires, plans, and intentions of persons; works of art unify quite disparate 
elements into complex wholes, and scientific theories unify pieces of knowledge as 
well as principles of explanation. We consider all of these things to be intrinsically 
valuable, and they all have the property of being complex wholes. This is at least 
 
9 Brief remarks that suggest that harmony and organic unity are the same thing, or at least very 
similar concepts, include Nozick (1981) or Kelly (2014). 
10 See, for example, Nozick (1981); Oddie (2005, 2014); Audi (2007); Davison (2012); Kelly 
(2014). 
11 See, for example, Nozick (1981). 
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evidence that the property of being a complex whole is the value-conferring property, 
and that complex unity grounds intrinsic value. 
While harmony and complex unity are not the same thing, the argument from 
explanatory depth also supports the idea that harmony is the metaphysical grounds of 
intrinsic value. The aforementioned items are all complex wholes, but it also seems 
intuitively plausible to say that in most cases, the constitutive elements of these 
entities stand in harmonious relation to one another – at least when they are good 
instances of their kind.12 For example, it seems plausible to say that the different 
organisms in a well-functioning ecosystem are in harmony; we might also think that 
friendships are characterized by a certain harmony among the friends; etc. Of course, 
there can be disharmonious friendships. This simply follows from the fact that 
harmony and complex unity are not the same thing. But this might be taken as 
evidence that speaks in favour of harmony as the metaphysical grounds of intrinsic 
value: if we think that in many cases, a good instance of X is an instance of X that is 
characterized by harmony, then this might support the idea that the fact that X is 
harmonious makes it the case that X is intrinsically good. The harmony of the 
constitutive elements would then be the metaphysical grounds if intrinsic value, not 
the property of having the structure of complex unity. In this sense, the argument 
from explanatory depth could support the idea that harmony grounds intrinsic value. 
In addition, there is a second and perhaps more important argument in favour of 
understanding harmony as the metaphysical grounds of intrinsic value. This is a 
variation of an argument that Robert Nozick has presented in support of the complex 
unity view but that seems to apply more to the harmony view. 
Nozick distinguishes between different ways of responding to value, namely 
valuing and anti-valuing (Nozick 1981, 429–430). Both “valuing” and “anti-valuing” 
are umbrella terms that cover a large variety of actions and attitudes that could best be 
described as pro- or contra-attitudes to value. Valuing includes, among other things, 
“bringing about, maintaining, saving from destruction, prizing, contemplating, 
valuing” (Nozick 1981, 429) what is valuable, whereas anti-valuing includes, among 
other things, “destroying, blocking the realization of, impending, scorning, ignoring, 
demeaning, shunning, negating, opposing, thwarting, rejecting, avoiding” (Nozick 
1981, 430) intrinsically good entities. Nozick argues that these ways of responding to 
value put an agent into a relationship with the valuable entity, and that these ways of 
standing in a relationship with a valuable entity are themselves valuable or invaluable. 
More specifically, it is intrinsically good to respond with pro-attitudes to what is 
intrinsically good, and it is intrinsically bad to respond with contra-attitudes to what is 
intrinsically bad. Similarly, it is intrinsically good to respond with contra-attitudes to 
what is intrinsically bad, and it is intrinsically bad to respond with pro-attitudes to 
what is intrinsically bad.13 
 
12 Admittedly, this does not seem to apply to the case of scientific theories. 
13 See also Hurka (2001). Other authors who accept this so-called recursive account of value 
include Chisholm (1986); Lemos (1994); Zimmerman (2001); Oddie (2005); Wedgwood 
(2009); Way (2013); Bradford (2013). 
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Nozick goes on to argue that a theory about the metaphysical grounds of value 
should be able to explain this independently plausible idea that a correct valuing of 
what is of value is itself valuable – and of course, the theory should be able to do so 
by its own standards. It would be quite unconvincing to argue that all value is to be 
explained in terms of X, and then go on to explain the goodness of appropriate value 
responses in terms of Y. This seems to be a problem for hedonist accounts of value, 
for instance. Not all forms of pro-attitudes towards intrinsic values are pleasurable, 
and the hedonist therefore seems to be committed to say that only some, but not all 
kinds of appropriate value responses are themselves intrinsically good, or to say that 
all kinds of appropriate responses to value are intrinsically good, but that the 
goodness of appropriate value responses is to be explained in some non-hedonist way. 
Both options have considerable theoretical cost. 
Nozick thinks that the complex unity account of intrinsic value fares better in this 
regard. An agent who responds appropriately to value stands in a specific relationship 
with value, and this means that the responding agent and the value form an organic 
unity: “The [valuing] verbs are verbs of unification; the relationships they specify 
establish and embody complex unities of the person with (what realizes) the values. 
The situation when these relationships hold will have some (positive) degree of 
organic unity, and so be ranked as valuable by the dimension of organic unity as 
underlying value” (Nozick 1981, 432). Thus, Nozick argues that the complex unity 
view has the important advantage that it can explain by its own standards why it is 
intrinsically good to respond appropriately to value. 
I think that Nozick is correct in thinking that it is a desideratum for a theory of 
value that the theory can explain in its own terms why it is intrinsically good to 
respond with pro-attitudes to intrinsically valuable entities. However, it is less clear 
whether the organic unity view fulfils this desideratum. To form a complex whole, the 
constitutive elements must form a new kind of entity that cannot be reduced to an 
aggregate of its constituent parts. But it is not clear in what sense there is a novel and 
distinct kind of entity that is constituted by the agent and the valuable entity. 14 
Furthermore, as Thomas Hurka (2001, 39) has pointed out, Nozick’s theory faces 
problems explaining why contra-attitudes to intrinsically bad entities are intrinsically 
good: a paradigm example of an appropriate contra-attitude to intrinsically bad 
entities consists in hating what’s intrinsically bad, but Nozick himself understands 
hating as a state of disunity (Nozick 1981, 433). But if unity is the grounds of intrinsic 
value, if hating what’s bad is intrinsically good, and if hating consists in a relation of 
disunity, then it is difficult to see how Nozick’s own account extends to such contra-
attitudes to disvalues. 
The harmony view seems to fare better in these regards. While it is implausible to 
think that the valuing agent and the value form a novel kind of entity, it seems more 
 
14 Much depends here on how the metaphysical question as to when different elements form a 
novel entity. I will not be able to discuss very complex question in the detail it deserves in this 
essay. 
HARMONY AND INTRINSIC VALUE 35 
 
Journal of East-West Thought 
 
plausible to maintain that an agent who responds appropriately to value stands in 
harmony with the valuable entity that she responds to. The attitudes and actions of the 
valuing agent respond to and match the value of the valuable entity, and in this sense, 
there are meaningful relations between the valuing agent and the valuable entity, even 
if they do not form a new kind of entity. And these meaningful relations also exist in 
cases in which the agent responds with contra-attitudes to intrinsically bad entities: in 
such cases, his attitudes match the disvalue of the object, and therefore they are also 
in harmony. Hence, the harmony view seems better equipped than the organic unity to 
explain the intrinsic value of appropriate value responses by its own lights, and this is 
certainly an advantage of the view. 
If one accepts the claim that harmony is the metaphysical grounds of intrinsic 
value, then several interesting implications seem to follow. Among these is that the 
harmony view offers a new interpretation of the consequentialist core intuition, 
namely the idea that morality is in some to be specified manner concerned with the 
impersonal good. And the harmony view might even offer a new account of 
understanding the overridingness of moral reasons. I will discuss these two possible 
implications in turn. 
 
III. Harmony, Consequentialism, and the Impersonal Good 
 
The first interesting implication of the harmony view is that it offers a new 
understanding of consequentialism. Consequentialists are concerned with the 
impersonal good. In other words, consequentialists think that morality is about 
making the world as good as possible, and what counts as the best possible state of 
affairs is not to be determined from anyone’s perspective in particular, but rather from 
an impersonal point of view, or the «point of view […] of the universe», as Sidgwick 
famously wrote (Sidgwick 1907, 382). Derek Parfit has expressed this idea by 
characterizing consequentialism as an “agent-neutral theory”: it “gives to all agents 
common moral aims” (Parfit 1984, 27). This also means that, as many authors have 
noted, consequentialism only allows for agent-neutral reasons for action. 15 
Consequentialists think that the overarching moral goal is to make the world as good 
as possible from an impersonal point of view, and this means that morality requires 
every agent to work towards this common goal. As a result, a society of perfect 
consequentialist agents is a society in which the individual ends of individual agents 
are in harmony: all agents aim at the same goal, namely making the world as good as 
possible, and this means that there can be no conflict between their individual 
ends.16,17 By contrast, a deontological theory does allow for morally justified conflict 
 
15 See, for example, McNaughton/Rawling (1995); Zong (2000); Wallace (2009). 
16 That consequentialism is a theory with the upshot that the ends of individual agents are in 
harmony has been noted by several authors. See, for example, Forcehimes/Senrau’s (2019: 
153) “Principle of Moral Harmony” according to which a “consequentialist theory must be 
such that the agents who satisfy it are guaranteed to bring about the best complete state of 
affairs collectively available to them.” Now, one might in what sense I am using the term 
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between ends because it allows for agent-relative reasons: your goal and my goal 
need not be the same if we are both fully committed deontologists (for example, my 
goal might be that my children fare well, and your goal might be that your children 
fare well, and this might lead to morally justified conflict between our goals if we 
both want to acquire a good that we both need for our respective children to fare 
well). 
Consequentialism thus has the following structure. All moral agents ought to 
have the same aim, namely, to make the world as good as possible. This means that 
we all have reasons to bring about as much value as possible. If we do so, we promote 
the impersonal good; and as a side effect, our ends are in harmony. In other words: 
consequentialists maintain that our ends are in harmony if and because they are all 
directed towards the impersonal good. The impersonal good is prior, and the 
harmonizing of our ends is a result of aiming at the antecedent impersonal good. 
The harmony view offers a new interpretation of consequentialism and the claim 
that consequentialism only allows for agent-neutral reasons as moral reasons for 
action. Proponents of the harmony view can maintain the consequentialist claims that 
reasons for action are grounded in value and that moral agents should be concerned 
with the impersonal good. Additionally, they can claim that the best state of affairs is 
identical with the state of affairs in which things exemplify harmony to the greatest 
degree – after all, if harmony grounds intrinsic value, then it seems plausible to think 
that the more harmony, the more value. Of course, the question is what “greatest 
harmony” means here. And proponents of the harmony view can argue that the 
greatest harmony is established if as much elements as possible are brought into 
harmony. In the practical realm, this means that the greatest harmony is achieved 
when the ends of all individual agents are brought into harmony – if, in other words, 
they are all directed towards a common goal, and if there is no conflict between them. 
This means that the harmony view can maintain that we all have reason to 
promote the impersonal good, which means that we have reason to harmonize our 
individual ends and direct them towards the same aim, and this in turn means that our 
moral reasons are all agent-neutral reasons.  The difference between classical 
consequentialism and the harmony view is that the classical view holds that agents are 
required to promote the impersonal good, that they therefore only have agent-neutral 
 
“harmony” here. In a sense, it just seems intuitive to say that, if a group of agents are all 
working towards the same goal, then their ends are in harmony. However, we can also use the 
brief characterization of harmony that I offered above to back up this claim. I have argued that, 
when elements are in harmony, there must be meaningful relations between them, and this is 
certainly the case when all agents are working towards the same common goal: the fact that 
their individual ends contribute to a common goal already establishes meaningful relations 
between the individual ends, since the successful pursuit of my end depends at least partly on 
whether others also successfully pursue their ends. For more on this, see Löschke (2019). 
17 Note that this understanding of harmonizing individual ends does not rule out diversity. After 
all, there is a lot of diversity in this kind of harmony, namely the diversity of the individual 
persons and their contributions to the overarching aim. 
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reasons, and that this means that their ends are in harmony when they act on their 
reasons, whereas the harmony view holds that agents are required to promote the 
impersonal good, that they are therefore required to harmonize their ends, and that 
they therefore only have agent-neutral reasons for action. Harmonizing their ends is 
not something that follows from aiming at realizing the greatest good: aiming at 
realizing the greatest good consists in harmonizing their individual ends. Or, to put it 
somewhat differently, the harmonizing does not follow from an antecedent 
understanding of what the impersonal good and the agent-neutral reasons for action 
are; the good that agents aim at consists in their individual ends being harmonized. Of 
course, the practical upshot will often be the same, but the order of explanation is 
reversed. And the important point is that, if the harmony view is correct, then this 
means that consequentialism does in fact follow from what value is. Once we 
understand what value is, we also understand that the greatest good consists in 
harmonizing our ends. Contrary to what some authors assume, 18  a proper 
understanding of value will then lead quite naturally to some form of 
consequentialism. 
 
IV. Harmony and Overridingness 
 
The second interesting implication of the harmony view is that it seems to offer a new 
explanation of a claim that many philosophers find attractive, namely the idea that 
moral reasons are overriding. To say that moral reasons are overriding is to say that 
they win if they conflict with non-moral reasons. If a moral reason speaks in favour of 
action A, whereas a non-moral reason speaks in favour of action B, then the 
overridingness thesis holds that you ought to do A, rather than B. Those philosophers 
who accept the overriding thesis find it attractive because it illustrates the importance 
that we usually assign to morality. Moral concerns do seem to trump self-interested 
concerns in many cases – it would be strange to develop a moral theory that tells you 
what you morally ought to do and then go on to say that the moral ought is 
conditional on not conflicting with your self-interest. If moral reasons were not 
overriding in this sense, then it would be difficult to explain why it is wrong to steal, 
tell a lie, murder a person, etc., in cases in which doing so would benefit you the 
most. The overridingness thesis is controversial, and I do not have the space to defend 
or reject it in this paper. Rather, what I want to show is that the harmony view 
provides a novel explanation of the overriding character of moral reasons. Thus, to 
the extent that one finds the overridingness thesis plausible (or implausible), one 
should also find the harmony view plausible (or implausible). 
The idea is this. We have already seen that the harmony view provides a novel 
account of the consequentialist concern with the impersonal good. As moral agents, 
we aim for the greatest good, and according to the harmony view, the greatest good is 
the state of affairs in which the individual ends of all agents are in harmony. Moral 
 
18 See, for example, Anderson (1993) or Wedgwood (2016). 
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reasons should be understood along these lines: they are reasons to act in harmony 
with the other members of the moral community. This means that an agent who acts 
on her self-interested reasons, rather than her moral reasons, disrupts the harmony 
between her ends and the ends of others: she makes it impossible to realize the 
greatest possible good. Of course, the agent who acts on her self-interested reasons 
also realizes value, namely value in her own life. But that value is always less than the 
value that she could realize by harmonizing her ends with others. The important point 
is that, according to the harmony view, there is no value pluralism, no 
incommensurability, and therefore no dualism of practical reasons.19 Furthermore, the 
separateness of persons plays no important role. And these are the most convincing 
possible reasons to reject the overridingness thesis. Hence, if the harmony view is 
true, then the overridingness thesis also seems to be true. 
To repeat, I am not arguing for the overridingness thesis, nor do I argue that the 
explanation that I have provided is the best possible explanation of the overridingness 
thesis. My point is that the overridingness thesis dovetails quite naturally with the 
harmony view. This again shows that the harmony view has interesting implications. 
Let me briefly sum up. The harmony view has several attractive features. It has 
explanatory depth and explains the intrinsic value of many things that we intuitively 
judge to be intrinsically valuable and that do not seem to have much in common at 
first sight. The view also explains by its own standards why it is intrinsically valuable 
to respond appropriately to the good. And it provides a novel account of the 
consequentialist idea that morality is concerned with the impersonal good, as well as a 
possible defence of the overriding thesis, which some find attractive. Hence, 
understanding harmony as the metaphysical grounds of intrinsic value is an 
interesting view that certainly deserves attention. However, there are also some 
problems with the view, and I will address some of them in the following section. 
 
V. Harmony as Intrinsic Value – Some Worries and Objections 
 
 A first worry with the harmony view is that it might have oppressive implications, 
especially when applied to personal relationships or the political realm. We do not 
value harmony over everything else – sometimes conflict can be quite useful or even 
desirable. For example, too much emphasis on harmony in friendships, family 
relationships, or romantic partnerships can make people hesitant to voice their needs 
 
19 When I say that according to the harmony view, there is no value pluralism, I mean that 
proponents of the view do not think that there are several values that are irreducible to one 
another, but that whenever something is valuable, it is because the constitutive elements of the 
thing are in harmony. This simply follows from the assumption that harmony is the (sole) 
metaphysical ground of intrinsic value. But that, of course, does not rule out that there is 
diversity and pluralism among the constitutive elements of the entity in question. Harmony 
presupposes variety among the things that are put in harmony; however, according to the 
harmony view, these things are not necessarily valuable before the harmonious relations are 
established. 
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or desires, and as result, they might feel that their needs are not met or taken 
seriously. Too much emphasis on harmony can then even lead to stronger and more 
disruptive conflicts down the line. Or take the case of social harmony. The hazards of 
too much emphasis on harmony seem even graver here. Too much emphasis on 
harmony within a society can lead to anti-liberal tendencies; in fact, we do not expect 
harmony within a democratic society, but rather conflicts that are nevertheless 
resolved in a peaceful manner. Hence, the objection goes, we value other things than 
harmony in our personal relationships or democratic societies, and this shows that 
harmony cannot be the grounds of intrinsic value. 
There are actually two worries here. The first worry is that too much emphasis on 
harmony might lead to bad results in the long run, as cases of personal relationships 
show. In other words, harmony can be instrumentally bad. This worry does not seem 
to be very damaging for the harmony view. On many accounts of intrinsic value, 
intrinsically valuable things can be instrumentally bad, and vice versa. Take pleasure 
as an example. Most accounts of intrinsic value include pleasure as an intrinsic good, 
but pleasure can obviously be instrumentally bad in many ways. For example, the 
pleasure that a heroin addict feels after taking her drug might be intrinsically good 
(since it is a case of pleasure), but it can lead to more pain and other disastrous 
consequences in the long run. Hence, the mere fact that individual instances of 
harmony might have bad consequences and lead to greater disharmony in the long run 
does not refute the claim that harmony is intrinsically good. 
The second worry poses a more serious challenge to the harmony view. The 
worry is that not only can harmony have bad consequences; it might even cease to be 
a valuable thing. The society that is described in Brave New World might seem 
harmonious, but it certainly does not seem to be intrinsically good. And neither do 
other societies that might appear harmonious – for example, totalitarian regimes 
might appear harmonious in the sense that everybody works for the same goal (say, 
win a war, or please the dictator, or whatever), but this is certainly not intrinsically 
good. And if this is true, then harmony cannot be the metaphysical grounds of 
intrinsic value. 
Against this worry, proponents of the harmony view can respond that harmony 
does not mean conformity. The greatest harmony is not only achieved when several 
elements are as conformable as possible, but when there is a wide variety of elements 
among which meaningful relations are established. Take a harmonious piece of music 
as an example. Two instruments can create great harmony if harmony is understood 
solely in terms of conformability. But the harmony that an orchestra can create seems 
to be greater, even if it is less harmonious when viewed merely in terms of 
conformability: the variety of the elements that are brought into harmony is greater, 
and this establishes more harmony overall. If this is correct, then the harmony view 
does not imply that we ought to value social homogeneity. In fact, it might actually 
speak in favour of a certain degree of pluralism and diversity, as this allows for more 
disparate elements among which harmonious relations can be established. 
However, it is not entirely clear whether this answer succeeds. It presupposes that 
the diversity of the elements among which harmony is established contributes to the 
overall degree of harmony of the entity in question. Such a similar claim certainly 
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seems reasonable in the case of complex unity: the more elements are unified, the 
greater the complexity of the entity in question, and hence the greater the degree of 
complex unity, all else being equal. But it is less clear whether this also applies to the 
case of harmony. If 100 voices are perfectly in sync, then the harmony that they 
establish seems to be greater than the harmony of 2000 voices that are slightly out of 
sync. And this suggests that in the case of harmony, what is important is the kind of 
relations that exist between the constitutive elements of an entity, rather than the 
degree of diversity of the elements between which the harmonious relations are 
established. I cannot discuss this matter in detail here, but I only want to point out that 
the worry that the harmony view supports social oppression when applied to the 
political realm cannot be as easily dispelled as in the case of complex unity. 
Another worry is this. We sometimes judge things to be intrinsically valuable 
despite or even in virtue of being disharmonious; hence, harmony does not seem to 
ground intrinsic value. Take the twelve-tone technique as an example. Modern music 
that is composed in the twelve-tone technique is aesthetically valuable, but the sounds 
often do not sound harmonious. This seems to be a kind of value that cannot be 
explained in terms of harmony. Now, some readers might object that the twelve-tone 
technique does exemplify harmony – it is simply a non-traditional understanding of 
harmony that is at work here. Music that is composed in the twelve-tone technique 
has a certain architectonical structure, and this means that there are meaningful 
relations between the individual tones. 
The problem with this possible response is that it makes the notion of harmony 
appear too wide. As I have argued above, harmony is not identical with complex 
unity. Stretching the notion of harmony in the way described lets harmony appear 
identical with complex unity. And even if a case can be made that in the end harmony 
and complex unity amount to the same thing, then this means that the harmony view 
is less interesting that it initially appeared: it simply collapses into the complex unity 
view, instead of being a novel account of the metaphysical grounds of intrinsic value. 
Nevertheless, harmony does not seem to be identical with complex unity, and the 
complex unity view has certain advantages over the harmony view as a result.  Take 
personal relationships as an example. The harmony view implies that personal 
relationships are only valuable if they are harmonious. Now, as I have argued above, 
it seems plausible to suppose that, all else being equal, personal relationships are 
better if they are more harmonious – if the marriage between A and B is harmonious, 
whereas C and D are married and tend to fight all the time, then most people would 
probably agree that the marriage of A and B is better than the marriage of C and D. 
But it is less clear whether relationships are only valuable if they are harmonious 
ones. Even if C and D fight all the time, you still might think that there is some value 
in their relationship. For example, historical accounts of love argue that the value of a 
relationship consists largely in its historical character and in the common history of 
the relationship’s members, and this means that the relationship of C and D can be of 
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value due to their common history, even if it is not a harmonious one.20 Now, the 
complex unity view seems well equipped to take such historical facts into account: it 
can very well claim, for example, that such historical structures are among the 
constitutive elements of a relationship, so that the history that two people have 
contributes to the existence of the relationship between them. In other words, 
common history establishes a novel entity and therefore complex unity. 
By contrast, it is less clear whether the harmony view can accommodate such 
historical considerations in a similar manner. When we talk call a relationship 
harmonious, we usually ascribe them an attribute that applies to them at the present 
time, rather than talking about them in a historical perspective. What matters is the 
relation between the constitutive elements as they are now, regardless of their history. 
Now, it is perhaps possible to give an account of the historical dimension of 
relationships – perhaps there is some harmony between the individual ends and 
desires of the relationship members in a diachronic perspective. However, the more 
plausible such explanations are, the more they seem to resemble the complex unity 
view – and as a result, the harmony view appears less interesting, as it once again 




Harmony is an underappreciated concept in Western analytic philosophy. This is 
perhaps an unfortunate situation: perhaps Western analytic philosophy should give the 
concept of harmony more attention. After all, it might play the most pivotal role in 
ethics: it might be the metaphysical grounds of intrinsic value. As I have argued, such 
a view has several advantages: it has explanatory depth and gives a unified 
explanation of the value of many things that do not seem to have much in common. 
Furthermore, it can explain by its own lights why it is intrinsically good to respond 
appropriately to intrinsically valuable entities: an agent who responds with pro-
attitudes to intrinsic values stands in a harmonious relation to value. And the view has 
interesting implications, as it provides a new interpretation and justification of 
consequentialism, as well as the overridingness thesis, according to which moral 
reasons trump non-moral reasons in cases of conflict. 
However, as we have seen, the harmony view also faces considerable challenges. 
It might have oppressive implications when it is applied to the political realm, and it 
is vulnerable to counterexamples. Furthermore, the harmony view seems to have 
problems accommodating the historical dimension of personal relationships. Of 
course, I have not argued decisively for or against the harmony view; there might be 
many other aspects and implications of the harmony view that are worthy of 
 
20 As an example for such a historical account of love, see Kolodny (2003). 
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discussion. In any case, harmony seems to be an underappreciated notion that 
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